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The Elasticity of the Individual: 
Early American Historiography and Emerson’s 
Philosophy of History
Yoshinari Yamaguchi
[O]ur endeavor has not been to write History in the order of time but 
in the order of the mind; which sort of History has this advantage, 
when successful, that it is not true in one particular case but must be 
true in all possible cases. Philosophy aims to supersede the voluminous 
chronicle of centuries by showing its eternal agreement with the order 
of thought in the mind of every man.
Ralph Waldo Emerson, The Philosophy of History
Just like other students of early national and antebellum American 
literature, I have been pulled back to Emerson time and again.1 This is 
an introductory essay on the development of American historiography, 
roughly from the post Revolutionary era to the mid 19th century. After 
years of struggle with historical writings published during the period in 
question, I have barely managed to come to a conclusion and confirmed 
my initial hypothesis about the singularity, or to be exact, natural historical 
detailedness and static atemporality of early American historiography, only 
to ﬁnd that the Sage of Concord hinted quite casually of my whole point in 
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his major lectures and essays. It feels so embarrassing and perplexing, but I 
have to admit, a bit soothing at home, too. By way of introduction to my main 
thesis on this subject, then, let me start with an overview of the problems of 
early American historical writings and how they are epitomized in Emerson’s 
idea of history.2
Writing a history is not a thing to be taken for granted, and when it 
comes to writing an American history, it is more than difﬁcult, or so it was 
especially in the late 18th to mid 19th century when the country freshly 
started its own independent national life. The dif ficulty was threefold 
then: first, primary source materials were scattered around both inside 
and outside of the country (the best document collections of relevance to 
American colonial and revolutionary history were deposited in the ofﬁce of 
the Board of Trade and Plantation in England and the Archives of the Marine 
and Colonies in France); second, even if materials were scratched together 
for use, America was a newborn country, unstoried and historically blank, 
in comparison with time-honored European countries; and third, and most 
signiﬁcantly, American history had to be new in form, too－not just a history 
of a new nation, but a new type of history. The traditional way of historical 
apprehension had been provided by the Puritan ancestry, whose typological 
worldview warranted every single event that did and would transpire in 
America as an antitype of its corresponding Biblical archetype. American 
history, in other words, was always already prophesied in the sacred history 
of Christianity. 
The task of early national historians was to set America free of such 
Puritan prophetic, or they might say, superstitious history, as well as of the 
dark past of the Old World. Just as American independence was the very 
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embodiment of the Enlightenment ideas of man and society, the historians 
were quite willing to view the past from the same enlightened and rational 
standpoint.3 Then it was a logical choice for them to stick to solid facts and 
individual source materials themselves, which had been taken for something 
predetermined and prescribed within the typological framework but was 
now free and open to rational and positivist interpretations. So daunting a 
challenge as it was, they set out to collect and preserve all the scattered 
materials pertaining to America. Their endeavor looked rather obsessive 
even to the point of being labeled “the cult of facts.”4 “New England people, 
especially those of Massachusetts and Connecticut,” one contemporary 
reviewer said, “ have always been a documentary people,” and he even 
went on to proclaim, “Let us gather every fragment of its history; let us 
allow nothing to be lost.”5  Source hunting had definitely consisted of 
the essential part of American historiography since its dawning era and 
produced a number of portly volumes of documentary history, such as 
Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society (1792 to the present), 
Jared Sparks’s compilation of biographies and writings of great men, Peter 
Force’s American Archives (9 vols., 1837－1853), Justin Winsor’s Narrative 
and Critical History of America (8 vols., 1884－1889) and Henry Harrisse’s 
Discovery of North America (1892). Winsor’s and Harrisse’s books pretend 
to be a “narrative” or a story of “Discovery of North America,” but these 
volumes are all collections of a forbiddingly huge amount of historical 
documents concerning America.
Once materials were ready on the table, the next procedure was to thread 
them together into a coherent narrative order. The last-quoted reviewer, while 
praising the exhaustive detailedness of Benjamin Trumbull’s Complete History 
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of Connecticut (2 vols., 1797－1818), could not but be afraid if “The common 
reader would be repelled from Trumbull’s book by the diffuseness with 
which he details the church histories of his villages. All knotty controversies 
in theology are duly canvassed; the half-way covenant and the inroads of 
sectarianism; the momentous incidents of church reproof and discipline; the 
merits of ministers; these are all considered with elaborate monotony.”6 This 
was true of all the documentary histories published in those days, which 
were encyclopedic, objective, but never narrative. And to make matters even 
more difficult, the historians already parted with the Puritan typological 
worldview, which had so far worked as a master narrative for human history; 
they had to create their own methods to depend on. In a sense, American 
historiography from the early national to the antebellum period was both 
an incubatory and a proving ground for new forms of historical narrative. 
From Jeremy Belknap’s History of New-Hampshire (3 vols., 1784－1792) to 
Francis Parkman’s seven-volume series of American colonial history, France 
and England in North America (1865－1892), American history tried out 
one form after another for the synthesis of otherwise disjointed individual 
events and episodes. Sometime it was presented in a satirical outfit, as in 
Belknap’s history; at another time, it was knitted with the geographical 
expanse and thereby spatialized and visualized on a cartographic image 
of the continent, as in Emma Willard’s “Histor y in Perspective”; and 
still another time, it was given the geological depth, as in Parkman’s 
representations of historic sites.7 And even more intriguingly, what was 
common to these efforts was their strong afﬁnity with natural history and its 
atemporal order. Natural history, the most prevalent way to deﬁne the New 
World from its discovery to the colonial era, served as a sort of paradigm for 
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early national historiography, although it left a subtle but indelible mark of 
ahistoricity on it and thus thwarted the full narrativization and temporalization 
of historical accounts. 
Natural history and early American historiography had much to share 
with each other in the first place－collecting, preserving, and ordering 
materials－, and in either case, the crucial point lay in how to handle 
individuals (individual natural objects, individual people, individual events, 
and individual documents). It was, in other words, the problem of how to 
reconcile the uniqueness and typicalness of individual components in the 
overall systematization.8 If you put a stress on the former, unruly individuals 
refuse to integrate themselves into a whole; and if you highlight the latter 
instead, each individual drowns its own unique identity in the general unity. 
And this problem of individuality was the very focal point to which early 
American historiography and Emerson’s philosophy of history directed 
themselves together, and as was always the case with Emerson’s dialectic 
argumentation, he introduced a remarkable model of individuality, which 
miraculously resolved the conﬂict between discrete particularity and general 
unity in historical narrative. 
Although Emerson openly depreciated history and lamented over the 
contemporary attitude of retrospectiveness, he addressed himself to history 
with apparently paradoxical pertinacity. Aside from the frequent references 
to the term, he began his ﬁrst essay collection with a discussion on “History,” 
and even chose for the title of his lecture series in 1836－1837 “The 
Philosophy of History.” History, conceived as distant “then” and “there,” 
was what his philosophy of “eternal Now” had to tackle squarely and 
overcome (PH, 158). In the course of the deliberate confrontation between 
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the present and the past, he then renovated history and suggested an 
ideal, if problematic as well, type of historical individual, which was a major 
concern of early national American historiography, too.
Let us take a look over the lecture series “The Philosophy of History.” 
The twelve lectures collected here are of great importance in understanding 
Emerson’s thought in general because some of his major ideas－Nature, 
Self-Reliance, Over-Soul, and of course, History, too－are found in their 
variant forms, and quite suggestively to the purpose of this essay, moreover, 
the first introductory lecture focuses upon the role of the individual in 
history and the last one is aptly titled “The Individual.” To begin with, 
Emerson explains about the historical development of the individual, which 
traces way back to ancient Greece: “In Greece, certainly, the individual 
begins to emerge, and we form acquaintance with persons, rather however 
from collateral record than from the formal history. But individuals recede 
again in Rome into the nation, and are more entirely lost in the wars of 
Europe in the Middle Ages” (PH, 8). And after a long interval, according 
to Emerson, the age of individuals has come with the birth of American 
democracy, and the true object of history then is man, the individual, “the 
portraiture in act of man, the most graceful, the most varied, the most fertile 
of actors” (PH, 9). Emerson’s encomium is unbounded for the individual, 
by which he means in this context a solid body equipped with natural-born 
potency, in contrast with the artificial and fictional power of conventional 
institutions. And yet, the demise of the individual comes all too soon. Even 
while his praise for the individual still reverberates in the air, he flatly 
downgrades the very same individual only a couple of pages later. “All 
our education,” he maintains, “aims to sink what is individual or personal 
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in us, to stimulate what is torpid of the human nature, and so to swell the 
individual to the outline of this Universal man and bring out his original and 
majestic proportions” (PH, 12). What really matters now is the “Universal 
man,” also known as “the Universal mind,” “Spirit,” “Over-Soul” or some 
divine principles that govern the whole universe. In one of other lectures 
that follow, the individual is taken for even “The antagonist nature to this 
Universal mind” (PH, 84). Hence a logical question: why is such a radical 
change possible in the characterization of the individual? Or why does 
Emerson bother about individuality anyway if his argument soon deserts it 
for universality? 
For those initiated into Emerson’s transcendental philosophy, the answer 
might be evident in the above-quoted line. The point is the elasticity of the 
individual, which enables one to “swell... to the outline of the Universal man” 
and identify with the divine spirit. In other words, the Emersonian individual 
can alternately expand and contract in its signiﬁcation, so that the distinction 
between individuality and universality turns out nothing actually. Note the 
elastic capability of the individual exercised in the following passage.
Civil History, Natural History, the history of art and of letters are to 
be explained from individual history or must remain words. There is 
nothing but is related to me; no mode of life so alien and grotesque but 
by careful comparison I can soon ﬁnd my place in it; ﬁnd a strict analogy 
between my experiences and whatever is real in those of any man. (PH, 
19)
At first, “individual” denotes something familiar, real, personal, and 
― 240― ― 241―
“related to me.” History must be a story of common everyday people, not 
in the least to do “with an Alaric or a Bourbon, with ﬁghters or lawmakers” 
(PH, 20). The personal “me” is, however, the one who can also detect a 
universal analogy among all human experiences, and thus the individual 
man is sublimated into the universal “Man,” “the one Mind common to 
all individual men” (PH, 11; H, 237). A crucial statement is set forth in the 
concluding lecture “The Individual.”
The Individual Man in the order of nature is of that importance, of that 
elastic and ever growing magnitude as to arrest and deserve the entire 
inﬂuences of nature and society upon himself.... As the mind unfolds it 
does not show itself as an adjunct to society but it becomes the central 
point from which all other individuals must be regarded. Others exist 
to illustrate to the individual the riches of his nature, to embody his 
thoughts, to fulﬁl the predictions of his spirit, to publish in the colors of 
the pleasant light the secrets which preexisted in the closet of the mind. 
(PH, 176)
This mechanism of elasticity works every time Emerson addresses the issue 
of the individual. The Emersonian individual resides at once in “now and 
here” as a real and personal entity with a temporally and spatially ﬁnite body 
and in “the everlasting Now, and the omnipotent Here” as an ideal being 
identical with the universal mind (PH, 90). 
The elasticity of the individual is the primary requisite for Emerson’s 
philosophy as a whole, so it recurs throughout his writings. Nature (1836), 
for example, features an extremely elastic self and its ready switch back 
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and forth between microscopic and macroscopic outlooks. Indeed Emerson 
ﬁrst admits “The whole character and fortune of the individual are affected 
by the least inequalities in the culture of the understanding; for example, in 
the perception of differences. Therefore is Space, and therefore Time, that 
man may know the things are not huddled and lumped, but sundered and 
individual” (N, 27). Still, while our attention is still directed to individuals, 
differences, Space and Time, his vision suddenly leaps high into the region 
of the universal laws: “Time and Space relations vanish as laws are known” 
(N, 27). Moreover, his terminology connotes the same instant alternation 
between individuality and universality. His words－especially, such major 
terms as “nature,” “soul,” “idea,” “man,” and the like－always bear the 
individual and universal connotations at the same time, whether the first 
letter is capitalized or not. At one moment, “nature” signiﬁes natural objects 
in the physical world, but next, without warning, it turns to something more 
holistic and spiritual, supernature. “Self” in “Self-Reliance” always implies 
both the individual self and the universal self. The process of the individual/
universal reciprocation is usually occult but intrinsic to nature, and man has 
the power to discern signs of the universal mind in individual entities and 
thread them one after another into a uniform chain. Emerson names a poet, 
among others, as the one “whose eyes integrate all parts” (N, 9).
Histor y doesn’t remain unaf fected by the alternate expansion and 
contraction of the individual, either; or on the contrary, it is one of the 
principal fields where its elastic nature is fulfilled to the utmost. All the 
historical events are now found to be both unique and general, and a 
historian, just like a poet, synthesizes them into the universal order of human 
history, which in turn reveals itself microcosmically in each component 
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part. Following this individual/universal reciprocation in each historical 
event, history necessarily acquires the same elasticity in its perspective. It 
alternately zooms in and out as it were, shuttling back and forth between 
individuality and universality, and grasps at once the innermost nooks and 
crannies of individual lives and the panoramic general view of universal 
history. Its perspective is, in Emerson’s own phraseology, “elastic as the gas 
of gunpowder... instantly our heads are bathed with galaxies, and our feet 
tread the ﬂoor of the Pit” (RM, 622). 
If the whole of history is in one man, it is all to be explained from 
individual experience. There is a relation between the hours of our life 
and the centuries of time. As the air I breathe is drawn from the great 
repositories of nature, as the light on my book is yielded by a star a 
hundred millions of miles distant, as the poise of my body depends 
on the equilibrium of centrifugal and centripetal forces, so the hours 
should be instructed by the ages, and the ages explained by the hours. 
Of the universal mind each individual man is one more incarnation. All 
its properties consist in him. Each new fact in his private experience 
ﬂashes a light on what great bodies of men have done, and the crises of 
his life refer to national crises. (H, 237－238; emphases added)
The whole history is incarnated in each person’s private life, so that “the 
deeper he dives into his privatest, secretest presentiment, to his wonder he 
finds, this is the most acceptable, most public, and universally true” (AS, 
64). Typically, Emerson ﬁrst zooms in to a most obscure private life, and the 
next moment his viewpoint soars up to the transcendental zoom-out platform 
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(just like a transparent eye-ball looking down from the hill) to recognize 
its identity with the general flow of human history. Every historiography 
must star t with most individual and personal facts, and then confirm 
their universality or direct connectedness with the universal mind, and 
come back again to individuality. “In like manner, all public facts are to be 
individualized, all private facts are to be generalized. Then at once History 
becomes ﬂuid and true, and Biography deep and sublime” (H, 246). When 
Emerson says “there is properly no history; only biography” (H, 240), what 
is on his mind is a biography of the individual/universal mind. A historian 
is the one who is possessed of the quick zoom-in-and-out elasticity in 
perspective, which effectively cancels all the distinctions between particular 
and general, past and present, and public and private, and reduces or rather 
inﬂates everything to be one and the same as the uniﬁed whole.
The best example of the zoom-in-and-out elastic historiography is, of 
course, Emerson’s own Representative Men: Seven Lectures (1850). This 
is a collection of biographies of historical celebrities, and in a sense, the 
whole book is a paean to heroic individuals, just as in Thomas Carlyle’s 
On Heroes, Hero-Worship and the Heroic in History (1841). A great man is, 
Emerson claims, the one “who inhabits a higher sphere of thought” and 
“has but to open his eyes to see things in a true light, and in large relations” 
while others must take great pains only to end up with false ideas in most 
cases (RM, 616). Without doubt, he is an exceptional individual, “a foreign 
greatness” (RM, 627). A moment later, however, the heroic individual 
suddenly turns out not so exceptional to distinguish himself completely from 
other people, nor foreign enough to stand independent and aloof. After all, 
he is a “representative” man: representative of the general population, or 
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more signiﬁcantly representative of the universal mind which he shares with 
all. At the most fundamental level, he is the same with others, being only a 
part of the whole. Individualism proves nothing, and the prime concern is 
again what is called the universal mind, soul, or genius－the spiritual kernel 
of all mankind. “The study of many individuals leads us to an elemental 
region wherein the individual is lost, or wherein all touch by their summits. 
Thought and feeling, that break out there, cannot be impounded by any 
fence of personality. This is the key to the power of the greatest men,－their 
spirit diffuses itself” (RM, 630－631). While dealing with a historical ﬁgure 
in particular, Emerson directs his vision far beyond to the all-inclusive spirit 
at the same time. This is the way history ought to be. 
The genius of humanity is the right point of view of history. The 
qualities abide; the men who exhibit them have now more, now less, 
and pass away; the qualities remain on another brow.... Happy, if a few 
names remain so high, that we have not been able to read them nearer, 
and age and comparison have not robbed them of a ray. But, at last, we 
shall cease to look in men for completeness, and shall content ourselves 
with their social and delegated quality. All that respects the individual is 
temporary and prospective.... [H]e appears as an exponent of a vaster 
mind and will. (RM, 631)
Plato, Shakespeare, and Goethe, whose biographies are collected in 
Representative Men, are esteemed as long as they are exponents of the 
universal mind, but not so because they are complete for themselves. The 
use of great men in history depends on how the study of their individual 
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lives guide us to “a vaster mind and will.”
Here is the most problematic and trickiest part of Emerson’s idea of 
history. Apparently, it duly meets the demands of the age of democracy, 
dragging down the heroic few from their thrones and replacing them with 
common men, who are found just as good as great men: “Each philosopher, 
each bard, each actor, has only done for me, as by a delegate, what one day 
I can do for myself.... What is that but saying, that we have come up with the 
point of view which the universal mind took through the eyes of one scribe; 
we have been that man, and have passed on” (AS, 67). And yet, what is the 
case with great men holds true for common men: they, too, are selfless 
scribes of the universal mind. Every individual, renowned or obscure, 
is valuable and trifling exactly for the same reason that his every action 
and thought is ascribed to the uniform agency of the Over-Soul. One will 
inﬁnitely expand to identify with the universe and, in so doing, indeﬁnitely 
diffuse into nothing.
We ﬁrst share the life by which things exist, and afterwards see them 
as appearances in nature, and forget that we have shared their cause. 
Here is the fountain of action and of thought. Here are the lungs of 
that inspiration which giveth man wisdom, and which cannot be denied 
without impiety and atheism. We lie in the lap of immense intelligence, 
which makes us receivers of its truth and organs of its activity. When we 
discern justice, when we discern truth, we do nothing of ourselves, but 
allow a passage to its beams. (SR, 269)
“I become a transparent eye-ball; I am nothing; I see all” (N, 10). It might 
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feel good to be embraced by the vital principles of the universe, but it is also 
an ontological crisis for each individual, who is now only a receiver or even 
“a passage” for the universal truth to come through. And by deﬁnition, the 
emptier the pathway is, the better. Each individual historical event also is an 
reenactment of the universal will, nothing original or unique on its own. 
How is history possible then? If at all, historiography would be like 
an endless cookie-cutting, which leads us to nowhere but a series of the 
same-size, same-shape and same-taste cookies. That uniformity is an 
index to the spiritual universality in human affairs, but how boring history 
would be to read and write about (The paradox of paradoxes is, that 
Emerson’s own historical account is a good read, as he himself is quite a 
character never to be contained by any measure). Not just boring, moreover, 
Emerson’s conception of histor y even denies the ver y historicity or 
dynamism of historical change, because universality, applied to the temporal 
order, is another name for eternity or static timelessness. For him, the 
universal mind is the timeless axiom of human history. “The Times are the 
masquerade of the eternities” (LT, 153); the true face of human civilization 
hasn’t changed so far and will never do so henceforth either, and each 
historical event and chronological era is only a fleeting expression of the 
eternal physiognomy of the universal mind. If the mission of historiography 
is, as Emerson insists, to detect “the oneness or the identity of the mind” 
through the course of apparent historical changes (AS, 67), then you don’t 
have to trace back to the remote past, let alone the mouldy stack of historical 
documents. Just look around yourself now and here, and you will ﬁnd the 
same eternal laws working just as well as it did in the past. “All inquiry 
into antiquity,－all curiosity respecting the Pyramids, the excavated cities, 
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Stonehenge, the Ohio Circles, Mexico, Memphis,－is the desire to do 
away this wild, savage, and preposterous There or Then, and introduce in 
its place the Here and the Now” (H, 241). Viewed from this angle, history 
should be a confirmation of the uniformity, not the diversity, of all human 
events. Emerson’s jeremiad, “Our age is retrospective” (N, 7), voices not 
the antihistorical injunction－Don’t look back－, but rather the nonhistorical 
mentality－You don’t have to look back because no fundamental distinction 
is admitted between the present and the past.9
Thus the elasticity of the individual precipitates history into a stasis. Of 
course, the elastic individual is an ideal type in historiography. If every 
individual can instantly turn universal and common to all, there is no 
possibility of conflict between individual component parts and the orderly 
narrative arrangement as a whole. The elastic individual is intrinsically 
plastic and perfectly ﬁt to the general course of history, so nothing is lost 
when incorporated into the overall order. Paradoxically, however, this ready 
adaptability also brings about the impossibility of history at the same time. 
Each individual event looks too universal, too common and too uniform 
through the course of time, so any sort of historical transition from one state 
to another is simply inconceivable. “The permanence and at the same time 
endless variety of spiritual nature ﬁnds its ﬁt symbol in the durable world, 
which never preserves the same face for two moments. All things change; 
moon and star stand still never a moment. Heaven, earth, sea, air, and man 
are in a perpetual ﬂux, yet is all motion circular, so that whilst all parts move 
the All is still” (PH, 32). Nothing changes in history, but it is only a surface 
form that metamorphoses as time goes by. Essentially, human history is in 
perpetual stasis. 
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When I assert the importance of Emerson’s idea of history as a clue to 
understand the nature of early American historiography, my point is that 
both share the problem of elastic individuality and its logical corollary, i.e., 
history in stasis. Admittedly, Emerson was a man of poetry, so his eternal 
history might look like a product of poetic intuition. And yet, it was not. 
The idea of eternity and universality in history was not a deviant caprice 
but the rule for the historians in early national and antebellum America. 
Or to be exact, it worked as a natural limit for their experimentation of 
historical narrative. The post-Revolutionary and early 19th-century American 
historians attempted to achieve freedom in historiography through the 
departure from the Puritan fated view of history, and allowed each individual 
historical subject its own unique and independent historical import. Still, 
when integrated into a coherent narrative form, those unique individuals 
suddenly turned necessary units in the eternal order of universal history. 
Quite simply, there was no narrative style conceived that could break 
down the limit of atemporality. Emma Willard and Jedidiah Morse put 
American history in a geographical order and rendered it as something 
spatially unfolded, but they realized in the end that the spatialization of 
history conﬁrmed the atemporality of their cartographic representations of 
history. Francis Parkman made a step forward to give the geological depth 
to his panoramic vision of history and thereby bring time to his historical 
accounts, but his conception of time was so uniform and circular, something 
like a regular layering one leaf of stratum upon another, virtually nothing 
was found moving and changing in its tableau.10 This static timelessness was 
a common feature of the late 18th- to mid 19th-century historiography in 
America. This is my thesis, in a nutshell.
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This introductory approach to early American historiography might as 
well conclude with an example illustrating how atemporal historical writings 
could be in those days. Let us take a quick look at the idea of “progress” 
expressed by one of the most noted historians of the day, George Bancroft, 
whose History of the United States of America (10 vols., 1834－1873; revised 
into 6 vols., 1876) was a culmination of the first golden era of American 
historiography. Asked to give a lecture for the semicentennial anniversary 
of the New York Historical Society in 1854, he chose the topic of historical 
progress, to be specific, “The Necessity, the Reality, and the Promise of 
the Progress of the Human Race,” and to our surprise, his discussion 
sounds exactly like Emerson’s. Although the term “progress” intimates the 
dynamism of continual historical changes, Bancroft urges us to realize it is 
not just like that. Human progress turns out to be about something eternal, 
universal, and thereby ahistorical.
Every man is in substance equal to his fellow man. His nature is 
changed neither by time nor by country.... Each member of the race is 
in will, affection and intellect, cosubstantial with every other; no passion, 
no noble or degrading affection, no generous or selfish impulse, has 
ever appeared, of which the germ does not exist in every breast. No 
science has been reached, no thought generated, no truth discovered, 
which has not from all time existed potentially in every human mind. 
The belief in the progress of the race does not, therefore, spring from 
the supposed possibility of his acquiring new faculties, or coming into 
the possession of a new nature. (PHR, 9) 
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Human progress doesn’t imply any addition to, nor any transmutation of, 
the universal order of things, but it instead is an unfolding of nature’s true 
potentiality, which might have been hitherto concealed but always been 
there. Truth, what Bancroft calls “the child of eternity,” never changes; “The 
progress of man consists in this, that he himself arrives at the perception 
of truth. The Divine mind, which is its source, left it to be discovered, 
appropriated and developed by ﬁnite creatures” (PHR, 9). Human progress 
is thus recognized to be of set purpose and goal, and the role of history is to 
record a steady unfolding of the divine will. Or it is not history that Bancroft 
is talking about here, but destiny, American manifest destiny.11
The late 18th- to mid 19th-century is often called “the age of history” in 
America.12 People’s interest in history was augmented by their newborn 
consciousness of national independence, and a number of local and national 
histories were published one after another to win popular acclaim. The 
nationalistic and romantic bent has been often detected in these writings, 
but what has been overlooked so far is that the era was totally devoid of any 
deﬁnite method of historiography.13 Having just parted with Puritan prophetic 
historiography, the historians of those days had to contrive their own ways to 
write a history. The early national to antebellum era was a period of so-called 
historiographical interregnum; the Puritans had gone already, and the next 
master narrative－the evolutionary theory－was yet so long to come, still 
unavailable then. Thus American historiography of this period performed a 
series of experiments about how one could narrate a history while unable to 
rely on any grand frame of reference. At one extreme, history was presented 
as a promiscuous accumulation of individual data (a plethoric documentary 
history, with stress on the uniqueness and independence of each individual 
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historical subject); at the other, history was welded into a rigid timeless 
order of the universal will (an Bancroftian history/destiny, with stress on the 
necessity of each individual historical subject); and the historians typically 
wavered between these two ends. 
Each historical event was unique and free, but at the same time 
predestined in the eternal principles of the universe. Emerson might be 
glad about this duality, because it perfectly matched with his poetic vision: 
“In poetry, where every word is free, every word is necessary” (PH, 49). 
Still, the same duality imposed a tremendous burden on the contemporary 
historians. Considering that their methodological groundwork was so 
unstable, it was quite incredible that so many attractive historical writings 
were produced during this period.
Notes
1 I totally agree with Ir ving Howe, when he says there is a so-called 
Emersonian climate in American culture. “To confront American culture 
is to feel oneself encircled by a thin but strong presence: a mist, a cloud, a 
climate. I call it Emersonian, an imprecise term but one that directs us to a 
dominant spirit in the national experience.” Howe, The American Newness 
(Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1986): i. 
2 This essay is an excerpt from an introductory chapter for what I am 
going to submit as a doctoral dissertation. I am so happy to acknowledge 
Professor Takeshi Morita’s warm encouragement I have received since my 
graduate school years on.
3 Lawrence Buell points out the post-Revolutionary ambivalence toward 
Puritanism. The early national “liberal” era exploited Puritan history and 
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legacy as an origin of the national self, but at the same time continually 
distanced itself from Puritanism or its rigid, irrational, and anti-liberal 
orthodoxy. See Buell, New England Literary Culture: From Revolution 
through Renaissance (New York: Cambridge UP, 1986): 193-213.
4 E. H Carr’s classic What Is History? touches upon the cult of facts in 19th-
century historiography. See also Michael Kraus, A History of American 
History (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1937): 171-183.
5 “ART. VII. -- Documentary History of the American Revolution. Published in 
Conformity to an Act of Congress. By MATTHEW ST. CLAIR CLARKE and 
PETER FORCE. Fourth Series. pp. 1886,” North American Review 46 (April 
1838): 476, 487.
6 “ART. VII. -- Documentary History of the American Revolution,” 479.
7 As for Emma Willard’s spatialization of history, see Yoshinari Yamaguchi, 
“American Geographico-History: Visibility and Timelessness of Emma 
Willard’s Progressive Maps and Histor y in Perspective,” Review of 
American Literature 20: 46-69. I published a part of my argument on 
Parkman’s historiography in Yamagichi, “The Panoramic Point of View 
and Visual Training for Americans: ‘Bird’s-Eye View’ Stories of Two 
Travelers,” Review of American Literature 21: 73-97; and “The Traveling 
Historian: Spatiality and Memories of Landscape in Francis Parkman’s 
Historiography,” Hiroko Washizu and Yoichiro Miyamoto, eds., Literature 
and Epistemological Frameworks (Tokyo: Yushokan, 2007): 77-103 
[*Written in Japanese]. As for Jeremy Belknap, I’ve just revised my paper 
presented at the annual conference of the American Literature Society of 
Japan on October 11, 2008, which will be published soon with a title “Natural 
History Turned National History: The Problem of Unity and Uniqueness in 
Jeremy Belknap’s Historiography.”
8 This issue has the same roots as what is called “the problem of induction,” 
which also highlights the handling of the individual. As for the problem 
of induction and its impact on the post-Enlightenment epistemology, see 
Mary Poovey, A History of the Modern Fact: Problems of Knowledgein the 
Science of Wealth and Society (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1998), and as for 
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its implications with natural history, see Christoph Irmscher, The Poetics 
of Natural History: From John Bartram to William James (New Brunswick, 
NJ: Rutgers UP, 1999).
9 R. W. B. Lewis gave a definition to “the antihistorical” and “the 
nonhistorical” respectively, and categorized Emerson into the nonhistorical 
group. See Lewis, The American Adam: Innocence, Tragedy and Tradition 
in the Nineteenth Century (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1955): 161.
10 According to Stephen Jay Gould, the geological thoughts have ever been 
inﬂuenced by either of these classic imageries, arrow and cycle, and they 
represents the two types of reasoning: to think temporally and to think 
spatially. Thinking temporally, one tends to imagine the world as an endless 
series of cause and effect stretched in a linear course, while the spatially 
oriented one is likely to think up a image of synchronic network of events. 
Put another way, the former is inclined toward change, and the latter is 
congenial to stasis. Both conceptual models are related to each other, but 
not evenly. The balance shifts according to the emphasis one puts on one or 
the other. Parkman’s idea of geological time is tinged with the cyclic mode 
of reasoning, also known as the uniformitarian view of history. See Stephen 
Jay Gould, Time’s Arrow, Time’s Cycle: Myth and Metaphor in the Discovery 
of Geological Time (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1987).
11 Etymologically, “destiny” derives from the Latin word “de + stare”, 
which means “establish” and “stand ﬁrm.” Thus the term implies its own 
ahistorical connotation. Wittingly or not, John O’Sullivan created a truly ﬁt 
metaphor for the ahistoricity of American history: “Manifest Destiny.” See 
John O’Sullivan, “Annexation,” The United States Magazine and Democratic 
Review.  17 (Jul/Aug 1845): 5-10.
12 As for the 19th-centur y booming of historical writings, see William 
Charvat, Literary Publishing in America 1790-1850 (1959; Amherst: U of 
Massachusetts P, 1993) and Buell, New England Literary Culture, 23-55, 
193-260. 
13 As for the survey of American historiography, see Kraus, A History of 
American History. 
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